In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privatelyobserved safety attribute; that is, consumers cannot observe directly the product's safety. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its safety prior to sale; alternatively, if a firm does not disclose its safety then consumers can attempt to infer its safety from the price charged. The liability system is important because it is a determinant of the firm's full marginal cost, which consists of both manufacturing cost and liability cost. If the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then the firm's marginal cost consists mainly of manufacturing cost, which is presumably higher for safer products. On the other hand, if the firm does bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then the firm's marginal cost consists of both manufacturing cost and liability cost. In this case, it is quite possible for a firm producing a safer product to have lower full marginal cost. We characterize the firm's equilibrium disclosure and pricing behavior, and derive a range of disclosure costs that would induce a high-safety type to choose disclosure over signaling. When the firm's full marginal cost is increasing (decreasing) in safety, a firm with a high-safety product will sometimes inefficiently choose to signal rather than disclose (to disclose rather than signal). Furthermore, whether ex ante information regulation (in the form of mandatory disclosure) or reliance on ex post liability that induces information revelation is the better policy also depends upon whether the firm faces substantial liability for a consumer's harm. Finally, we find that a small fraction of naively optimistic consumers leads to higher profits for both less-safe and safer products, and a reduced incentive for voluntary disclosure. Alternatively, if the naive consumers are pessimistic, then while the signaling profits of the low-safety firm type are unaffected, those of the high-safety firm type are diminished, leading to an increased incentive for the firm to choose disclosure over signaling.
Introduction
In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a safety attribute. We assume that the firm knows whether its product is of high safety or low safety (its "type"), where a safer product is one with a lower probability of causing harm. Consumers of the product cannot observe directly the product's safety, but they can learn safety through one of two routes. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its safety prior to sale; alternatively, if a firm does not disclose its safety then consumers can attempt to infer its safety from the price charged. That is, consumers may learn the product's safety through disclosure or through signaling.
The liability system is important because it is a determinant of the firm's full marginal cost, which consists of both manufacturing cost and liability cost; this dependence of marginal cost on liability in turn affects the price and the output level for the firm, thereby influencing welfare. In particular, if the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then the firm's marginal cost consists mainly of manufacturing cost, which is presumably higher for safer products.
On the other hand, if the firm does bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then the firm's marginal cost consists of both manufacturing cost and liability cost. In this case, it is quite possible for a firm producing a safer product to have lower full marginal cost (the composition of marginal cost and its relationship to liability law will be discussed in detail below). We show that whether high safety is signaled with a higher or a lower price (than would occur under full information) depends critically upon whether the firm bears substantial liability for a consumer's harm. 1 Since the safety of a firm's product is revealed -either through disclosure or through 2 2
We say "typically" because when the marginal cost of a low-safety unit is substantially higher than the marginal cost of a high-safety unit, then the firm with the high-safety product can signal without distorting its price away from the full-information level.
signaling -a welfare analysis of voluntary disclosure now focuses not on how much information is ultimately revealed, but whether it is revealed through the socially-optimal channel. A low-safety type charges its full-information price and makes its full-information profits in a separating signaling equilibrium; consequently, a low-safety type will never engage in disclosure for any positive disclosure cost. When the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then in a separating signaling equilibrium the high-safety type charges a higher price and sells less output than it would under full information (a fortiori, this is less than the socially-optimal output). Since the firm considers its own profit increase from disclosure, but not the value of the additional output to consumers, there will be a range of disclosure costs for which the high-safety type inefficiently chooses to signal rather than disclose. In this parameter regime a mandatory disclosure rule may be beneficial (this is discussed with more precision in Section 4). However, when the firm does bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then in a separating signaling equilibrium the high-safety type typically 2 charges a lower price and sells more output than it would under full information (though still less than the socially-optimal output). In this case, although there is a range of disclosure costs for which the high-safety type will choose disclosure, any disclosure by the highsafety type is welfare-impairing, even if the disclosure cost is zero. Thus, whether ex ante information regulation (in the form of mandatory disclosure) or reliance on ex post liability that induces information revelation is the better policy also depends upon whether the firm faces substantial liability for a consumer's harm.
Finally, we re-consider the analysis under the assumption that a small fraction of consumers 3 3 A third distinct approach to unobservable quality involves the idea of a "qualityguaranteeing price" (beginning with Klein and Leffler, 1981; see Bester, 1998 , for a recent example and further references). In this literature, quality is endogenously-chosen by the firm after it posts its price. A firm that dilutes its quality will lose future sales, and a firm that charges too low a price will have an incentive to subsequently dilute quality. Understanding this, consumers will not buy at such prices. Instead, there is a threshold price that is high enough to make it optimal for the firm subsequently to provide high quality rather than to cash in now and forego future sales. Consumers will only be willing to buy at prices at or above this quality-guaranteeing price.
are "naive:" while these consumers become informed when safety is disclosed, they do not update their beliefs about safety based on the product's price (following non-disclosure). We first consider naively optimistic consumers, who persistently believe that the product is of high safety, and purchase accordingly. We find that the presence of such consumers is beneficial not only to the lowsafety type, but also to the high-safety type (since it need not engage in as much distortion in order to signal its safety). Since both firm types enjoy higher profits in the separating signaling equilibrium, incentives for voluntary disclosure are reduced by the presence of optimistic consumers. In contrast, when the naive consumers are pessimistic (i.e., in the absence of disclosure they persistently believe that the product is of low safety and purchase accordingly), then the lowsafety type's signaling profits are unchanged but the high-safety type's signaling profits are diminished. Thus, incentives for voluntary disclosure are enhanced by the presence of naively pessimistic consumers.
Literature Review
There is an extensive economics literature that deals with firms selling products whose quality is exogenous and known to the firms themselves, but is not observable to consumers prior to purchase. Two alternative conceptualizations of the problem have yielded two streams of research between which, to our knowledge, there is virtually no cross-talk. The two 3 resulting 4 4 Most disclosure models do not consider liability cost for the firm; those that do consider it assume perfect compensation, so consumers do not care about quality (see, for example, Polinsky and Shavell, 2006) . 5 For examples of models which involve a single firm (or can be viewed as such due to a lack of strategic interaction), see Viscusi (1978) , Grossman (1981 ), Milgrom (1981 , Jovanovic (1982) , Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) , Milgrom and Roberts (1986b) , Shavell (1994) and Polinsky and Shavell (2006) . For examples involving multiple firms, see Board (2003) , Cheong and Kim (2004) , Levin, Peck and Ye (2005) , and Hotz and Xiao (2005) . 6 But see Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a,b) for models that do make this assumption. 7 Examples include Bagwell and Riordan (1991) , Bagwell (1993) , Shieh (1993) , Fluet and Garella (2002) , and Reinganum (2005, 2007a) . 8 Examples include Milgrom and Roberts (1986a) and Reinganum (1995, 2005) .
literatures are (1) the disclosure literature, which assumes that a firm can credibly disclose its quality, perhaps at a cost; and (2) the signaling literature, which assumes that a firm cannot credibly disclose its quality and must rely on other strategies, most notably the price, that might convey information. The disclosure literature invariably makes an assumption which renders signaling impossible: the marginal cost of production is independent of quality. 4 Thus, for these models, nondisclosure is consistent with all non-disclosing types charging the same price.
5 Few signaling models of product quality assume that products of different quality are equally costly to produce.
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Most signaling models assume that higher-quality products are more costly, 7 and some are agnostic on the issue, allowing higher-quality products to be either more or less costly. 8 This difference in marginal costs allows the price chosen by the firm to reveal its product's quality.
Several previous papers develop models in which price signals product quality; such a model will appear as part of our analysis, but it will be augmented with a disclosure decision.
Bagwell and Riordan (1991) provide a two-type model which is very similar to the one we use for 5 9 One exception is Levin, Peck and Ye (2005) , who consider both alternatives: (1) the disclosure decision is made before the firm learns its product quality; and (2) the disclosure decision is made after the firm learns its product quality.
10 Spence (1977) and Arlen and Bunting (2006) ask whether voluntary contracting over liability can signal quality when price is determined competitively. our signaling subgame; the main difference is that we also allow full marginal cost to decrease in quality, which is envisioned in this paper as safety. Daughety and Reinganum (1995) provide a model with a continuum of types that permits marginal cost to be either increasing in safety or decreasing in safety; the signaling portion of our current model is essentially a two-type version of this model. Daughety and Reinganum (2005) provide a model with a continuum of types and unit demand; in that paper, the firm can commit to a disclosure policy before it learns its type, but cannot make a disclosure after learning its type. In the current paper, we model the disclosure decision as occurring after the firm has learned its type, consistent with the usual timing in the disclosure literature.
9 Finally, in Daughety and Reinganum (2007a, forthcoming) , no disclosure is possible but multiple firms engage in price-quality signaling under the assumption that marginal cost is increasing in quality.
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On the disclosure side of the literature, Jovanovic (1982) and Polinsky and Shavell (2006) are perhaps the closest in certain attributes to our paper. Jovanovic assumes that a firm knows the quality of its own good, but disclosure is costly. Since marginal cost does not vary with quality, all firms that do not disclose set the same price (that is, price cannot serve as a signal of quality following non-disclosure). Polinsky and Shavell (2006) examine a model in which firms that may face liability for harm can disclose quality information costlessly, but need not acquire it. They examine the usefulness of mandatory disclosure rules in this context, with particular emphasis on 6 11 In a companion paper (Daughety and Reinganum, 2007b) , we examine a version of the signaling-versus-disclosure model with a continuum of quality levels; however, that paper does not consider firm liability for losses nor does it consider the effects of naive consumers on pricing and how they affect incentives to acquire information in the first place. Absent liability, if acquisition were costless then skeptical beliefs on the part of consumers would induce the firm to acquire information and then disclose it. But if information is costly to acquire, then a firm may not disclose its quality either because it does not know its quality, or because it knows its quality is low (a firm which learns that its product is of high quality will disclose this). Again, since marginal cost does not vary with quality, price cannot serve as a signal of quality following non-disclosure. Polinsky and Shavell then consider liability under both a negligence standard and strict liability. Since the firm will meet the standard of care in a negligence regime, this will reduce to the previous analysis in which the consumer bears all of the loss (and, since liability costs are zero, the firm's marginal cost does not vary with quality). When the firm faces strict liability, then its marginal liability costs must vary with quality, but in this case Polinsky and Shavell assume that the consumer is fullycompensated and hence she no longer cares about quality (and the firm no longer cares about disclosure).
In our model, the acquisition of information is costless but its disclosure is costly, and thus some firm types will not disclose (as in Jovanovic, 1982) . However, because marginal cost varies with safety (and because consumers still bear some of the loss, so they care about safety), the firm's price will serve as a signal of its product's safety following non-disclosure. Thus, our assessment of the value of mandatory disclosure focuses not on the amount of information that is ultimately provided, but on whether it is provided through the socially-optimal channel (e.g., disclosure or signaling). 12 Since completing this paper, we have become aware of a working paper by Caldieraro, Shin and Stivers (2007) that assumes one high-quality and one low-quality firm (firms know each others' qualities; consumers cannot observe quality directly). After firms individually choose whether or not to disclose, only some consumers observe the disclosure, leading to both disclosure and signaling by the firms. Even though disclosure is free, consumers cannot induce "unraveling" as they cannot employ skeptical beliefs. 13 A related paper from the auction literature is Cai, Riley and Ye (forthcoming) . A seller with private information regarding her own valuation auctions an item to multiple potential buyers, whose valuations are positively-correlated with that of the seller. The seller's reserve price signals her value to the buyers but signaling involves distortion. In the working paper version, the authors briefly discuss an application involving costly external value certification.
14 This occurs because they assume two different types of consumer, each of which demands one unit; one type of consumer becomes "informed" about quality when a disclosure is made, while the other remains "uninformed" about actual quality, but is aware that a disclosure has been made. In this setting, an "uninformed" consumer can draw an inference from the firm's price about its quality. To see how this can happen, suppose that most consumers are capable of becoming "informed." Then a firm that makes a disclosure and charges a high price will only do so if it is a high-quality firm, for if it were a low-quality firm charging a high price, it would alienate all of the informed consumers. So an uninformed consumer who knows that a disclosure was made (but not its content) can infer from a high price that the firm has a high-quality product.
The only published paper of which we are aware that involves both disclosure and signaling is Fishman and Hagerty (2003) . 12, 13 However, in their model disclosure and signaling are not substitutes (as they are in our model), but complements, due to an externality between different types of consumers. Thus, signaling does not accompany non-disclosure in their model (because they maintain the crucial assumption that marginal cost is the same for high-and low-quality products);
it can only accompany disclosure. 14 Our model is very different from that of Fishman and Hagerty (2003) in that all consumers become informed about safety when the firm discloses it; moreover, our consumers have downward-sloping demand. Our firm has a marginal cost that is safetydependent, though it may be increasing or decreasing in safety. Thus, if a firm does not disclose its safety directly, it reveals it through its price: disclosure and signaling are substitutes.
Plan of the Paper
In Section 2, we describe the model set-up and notation. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium pricing with and without disclosure. Section 4 compares equilibrium disclosure with sociallyoptimal disclosure and considers the desirability of mandatory disclosure rules. Section 5 modifies the preceding analysis to incorporate naive consumers who do not apply the skeptical beliefs that are integral to both signaling and disclosure models. While these consumers become informed when safety is disclosed, they do not update their beliefs about safety based on the product's price (following non-disclosure). Section 6 summarizes and suggests some possible extensions.
Extensive derivations are provided in the Appendix.
Model Set-up

Safety
Assume that a single firm produces a product that may be of either high (H) safety or low (L) safety; let λ 0 (0, 1) denote the probability that the product is of high safety. Safety itself takes the form of a probability that the consumer is not harmed by the product. Let θ i represent the probability that the consumer is not harmed by the product of type i 0 {H, L}, where 1 > θ H > θ L > 0. Thus, either type of product may be used without harm in a given instance of its consumption, but either type of product may also cause harm in a given instance; the key attribute is that highersafety products are more likely to be used without harm.
Liability
When use of the product causes harm, a loss is created; this loss includes the actual harm experienced by the consumer, plus any costs associated with settlement or trial. The liability system 9 15 When a consumer is physically (or emotionally) harmed, the liability system supersedes any contractual liability such as a warranty (which might otherwise serve as a signal of safety). Most warranties offer very limited compensation, such as repair or replacement of the item. Moreover (allowing for litigation costs and the difficulty of proving causation), the extent of contractual liability that must be assumed in order to signal safety would typically exceed the expected harm, and thus might run afoul of the penalty doctrine. Under the penalty doctrine, the common law does not enforce stipulated damages in excess of expected damages (Rea, 1998, p. 24) .
allocates the loss between the consumer and the firm, by specifying how much compensation is due to the consumer from the firm, and under what circumstances. 15 For instance, assuming strict liability, the firm is responsible for the consumer's harm, but each party is responsible for her own legal costs. Moreover, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to establish causation in a given instance.
Thus, we expect that consumers will bear some residual loss, and we denote the anticipated uncompensated loss to the consumer by δ > 0. We denote the firm's anticipated liability payment in the event of harm by γ > 0; thus, the total loss is given by T = δ + γ.
Consumers
Both types of product provide utility to the consumer, but a unit that fails provides less utility. In particular, assume that the consumer's utility is quadratic in the quantity consumed of the product of interest, with the coefficient on the quadratic term denoted β, and the coefficient on the linear term denoted α in the case of a unit that does not cause harm and α -δ in the case of a unit that fails, causing the consumer to bear the loss δ. The consumer may or may not be able to observe directly the product's safety before purchase. Let the perceived safety of the good be denoted θ.
If the product's safety is observable before purchase (e.g., because the firm discloses it), then θ = θ i , for i 0 {H, L}; on the other hand, if the product's safety is not observable before purchase, then these perceptions will be determined as part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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16 We specifically rule out the knife-edge case of k = γ, since this implies that marginal cost is the same for both levels of safety. In this case, price cannot serve as a signal of safety and we are back in the traditional disclosure model in which non-disclosure results in all non-disclosing types charging the same price. The consumer's utility function is quasi-linear in all other goods; thus, if the price of the product is p, the consumer's income is I, and she consumes q units of the good with perceived safety θ, then her utility is given by:
Therefore, the consumer's demand for the product of perceived quality θ is given by:
Note that the quantity demanded is an increasing function of perceived quality.
The Firm
The firm of type i manufactures units of the product at a constant marginal cost of c(θ i ), i 0 {H, L}. This cost consists of marginal manufacturing cost, denoted kθ i with k > 0, which is increasing in safety (that is, safer products cost more to produce) and marginal expected liability cost, denoted γ(1 -θ i ), which is decreasing in safety (that is, safer products generate lower expected liability cost). Thus, c(θ i ) = kθ i + γ(1 -θ i ) is the firm's full marginal cost; the firm's full marginal cost is increasing in safety if k > γ, and decreasing in safety if k < γ. If the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then γ will be small and thus k > γ. On the other hand, if the firm does bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then γ will be large and thus k < γ.
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The gross profits for the firm depend on its true price-cost margin and consumer demand, which depends on perceived safety:
The firm of type i can affect its perceived safety in two ways, through its disclosure policy and its price. If the firm elects to disclose its safety, then θ = θ i . We assume that disclosure requires a cost of D > 0; this reflects the need for verification of the firm's type by some independent third party. This verification could be achieved by testing a sample of units, or by surveying a sample of consumers about their experiences (without providing them any reward that is contingent on their answers). If the firm elects not to disclose its safety, consumers will base their perceptions of safety on the accompanying price. We model the choice of disclosure policy and price as being simultaneous, once the firm has learned its true type.
The following parameter restrictions will be maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 implies that the high-safety product is socially-preferred to the low-safety product (even though the high-safety product is more costly to produce). Alternatively put, Assumption 1 implies that the combined loss from an accident (δ + γ) exceeds the incremental production cost of improving safety (k). Assumption 2 ensures that both firm types can make positive profits, whether they are correctly-perceived or mis-perceived as the other type (since α H > α L , it follows from Assumption 2 that α H > max {c H , c L } as well). Another implication of Assumption 2 is that both products are socially-beneficial; consumers might, in principle, over-pay for a unit, but neither product type generates negative expected surplus. 17 Although there exists a continuum of separating equilibria, the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987 ) selects a unique one; see the Appendix for details. Similarly, although pooling equilibria exist, they do not survive refinement using the Intuitive Criterion (see the Appendix).
Equilibrium Pricing With and Without Disclosure
In this section, we first characterize the equilibrium pricing behavior that accompanies a decision to disclose safety directly. Next, we characterize equilibrium pricing behavior when the disclosure cost D is prohibitively high; this involves solving a relatively straightforward signaling model in which price reveals safety. In Section 4, we lower the disclosure cost to determine which types, if any, will defect from signaling to the outside option of direct disclosure.
Note that any firm type that discloses can (and will) charge its full-information monopoly price (that is, the price it would charge if consumers could observe safety directly). Let P f i denote the full-information monopoly price for a firm producing a product of type i, and let Π Now suppose that the disclosure cost D is prohibitively high, so it is common knowledge that no firm type will choose disclosure. Then consumers will try to infer product safety from the price that is being charged. We will characterize a (refined) separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which price serves as a signal of safety.
17 Let B(p) be the belief function that relates the firm's price to the consumer's perceived safety; thus, if the firm charges the price p, then it is inferred to have safety B(p) 0 {θ H , θ L }. A firm charging price p, with true safety θ i and perceived safety θ = B(p), 
The following proposition is proved in the Appendix. Proposition 1. There is a unique (refined) separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium in prices:
(i) the low-safety type always charges its full-information price, It is worth noting that, even when the high-safety type's price is distorted, it still belongs to the interval (c H , α H ), so both the price-cost margin and equilibrium output are positive.
The intuition for the structure of this equilibrium is as follows. First, since it will be revealed
19 As is shown in the Appendix, the H-type firm would prefer to charge P s H and be recognized as an H-type than to choose its best alternative price and be taken for an L-type. Mimicry by the L-type firm can also be deterred by a downward-distorted price but the H-type firm would rather give up and be taken for an L-type than to use such a price to distinguish itself. 20 A sufficient condition for this cost disadvantage to be moderate is that the high-safety type's full-information price is higher than that of the low-safety type: that is,
in a separating equilibrium, the low-safety type can do no better than to price at its full-information price and obtain its full-information profits. Second, in order to ensure separation, the high-safety type must choose a price that a low-safety type would not mimic. When the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then γ is small and k -γ > 0, implying that 18 c H -c L > 0.
Thus, the proposition says that when the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then the high-safety type signals its safety by distorting its price upward from its fullinformation price. Increasing its price (and thus foregoing some sales) is less expensive for the highsafety type than it is for the low-safety type, because the low-safety type has the larger price-cost margin for any given price and hence loses more than the high-safety type on each foregone sale.
There is a high enough price P s H (and thus a low enough sales volume) that makes the low-safety type indifferent between mimicry and accepting its full-information profits.
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On the other hand, when the firm bears substantial liability for a consumer's harm, then γ is large and γ -k > 0, implying that c L -c H > 0. We will refer to the cost difference c L -c H , which measures the low-safety product's cost disadvantage, as "moderate" when (c L -c H )
The proposition indicates that when the cost difference c L -c H is moderate, 20 then the high-safety type must distort its price downward from its full-information value. Downward distortion can deter mimicry because a price 15 21 As is shown in the Appendix, the H-type firm would prefer to charge P s H and be recognized as an H-type than to choose its best alternative price and be taken for an L-type. Mimicry by the L-type firm can also be deterred by an upward-distorted price but the H-type firm would rather give up and be taken for an L-type than to use such a price to distinguish itself. decrease (which increases sales) is less attractive for a low-safety type than for a high-safety type since the low-safety type now has a lower price-cost margin for any given price. There is a low enough price P s H that makes the low-safety type indifferent between mimicry and accepting its fullinformation profits.
21 When the cost difference c L -c H is large, then the high-safety type need not distort its price in order to be recognized; its full-information price is already so low that the lowsafety type does not want to mimic it, even if doing so would result in an inference of high safety.
Equilibrium and Socially-Optimal Disclosure
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 is that the high-safety type suffers a loss in profit due to private information: that is, Π type's payoff will continue to be the same regardless of the high-safety type's decision to disclose (the low-safety type will continue to choose its full-information monopoly price), the low-safety type continues to eschew disclosure. Only at D = 0 does the low-safety type become indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing (and similarly for the high-safety type when the low-safety product's cost disadvantage is large). These results are summarized in the following proposition. In this paper we consider only a regime of strict liability. It is worth noting, however, that these results are essentially robust to an alternative liability regime in which disclosure relieves the firm of liability.
22 This is because the full-information profits are unchanged by this liability shift, as long as the total anticipated loss (γ + δ) is constant. If the loss γ is shifted to the consumer upon the firm's disclosure of its type θ, the consumer simply subtracts γ(1 -θ) from her maximum willingness-to-pay for the good. The firm's profit margin, the consumer's demand, and thus the firm's profit, are all unchanged. This invariance to the allocation of losses under full information can also be seen by inspection of the firm's full-information profit function, which depends only on the total expected harm and not on how it is divided between the parties. Thus, this shift also leaves unchanged the firm's incentive to disclose. To the extent that a shift to no liability following disclosure reduces the total anticipated loss (since expected litigation costs will now be zero), the firm's profits following disclosure will be somewhat higher and thus the incentives for disclosure will be somewhat stronger. In particular, if the disclosure cost is sufficiently small, even an L-type firm may find it optimal to disclose if this would insulate it from liability for harm. 
Welfare Analysis of Voluntary Disclosure
As was mentioned in the Introduction, when marginal cost varies with safety the alternative to disclosure is not "non-disclosure," but signaling: both firms' types are ultimately revealed, but possibly through different channels. A welfare analysis of disclosure then rests not on the amount of information that is ultimately provided, but on whether it is provided through the socially-optimal channel. The firm pays a lump-sum cost associated with disclosure, while the firm's cost of signaling sometimes involves distortions in pricing and output. Although the lump-sum cost of disclosure affects total surplus in the same way as it affects profits (that is, via simple subtraction), distortions in pricing and output can affect firm profits and consumer or total surplus in very different ways.
In a regime of voluntary disclosure, the low-safety type does not engage in costly disclosure, because signaling entails no cost. Thus, the private and social incentives to disclose coincide for the low-safety type. information results in greater output (though it is still less than the socially-optimal amount). Since the firm incorporates only the effect on profits in making its disclosure decision, there will exist values of the disclosure cost D for which the firm will choose not to disclose when it would be socially optimal for it to do so (i.e., Π signaling requires the firm to lower its price and expand its output relative to the full-information monopoly levels, which provides a benefit to consumers and an increase in total surplus. Thus, when c L -c H > 0 consumers (and a social planner) would always prefer information transmission to occur through signaling rather than disclosure. Clearly there are values of the disclosure cost D > 0 for which the firm also prefers signaling to disclosure, but there are also values of D > 0 for which the firm can improve its profits by disclosing (since it can then raise its price and reduce its output to coincide with the full-information monopoly optimum). This disclosure is socially excessive, even if it is free.
Mandatory Disclosure
The foregoing indicates that there may be too little disclosure when the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm (i.e., when c H > c L ), while there may be too much 26 For an example of this, see Daughety and Reinganum (1995) . 27 We thank Abraham Wickelgren for identifying this additional benefit. This suggests that mandatory disclosure requirements are most likely to be beneficial in markets wherein safety is likely to be high (i.e., λ is high), but safer units are more costly to manufacture and the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer's harm (i.e., c H > c L ), and the disclosure cost is neither too high nor too low (i.e., D
Although we have assumed thus far that product safety is exogenous, one could append a prior stage to this model wherein a firm could invest so as to affect the distribution from which its safety is ultimately drawn (safety-related investment would affect λ). profits has little incentive to try to improve its product quality; indeed, it will invest to try to lower 20 28 This perverse result is typical of price-quality signaling models; it can be reversed in a variety of sensible ways when one wishes to make safety endogenous. For example, the risk θ could reflect a technology with alternative uses (e.g., a "better" technology improves safety when used to produce therapeutic drugs, and yields higher output when used to produce generic multi-vitamins). While high quality is disadvantageous in the market for the product with the safety attribute, it can still be advantageous for the firm overall (Daughety and Reinganum, 2005) . Alternatively, the model we are exploring might concern a new product whose safety is initially uncertain but will eventually become common knowledge (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) . While high safety is disadvantageous in the introductory period, it is advantageous in the long run. A mandatory disclosure rule is another way to provide incentives for safety-enhancing R&D. its likelihood of ultimately producing a safer product. 28 However, under a mandatory disclosure rule, the high-safety type would earn higher profits than the low-safety type, since
Now the firm has an incentive to invest so as to improve its likelihood of ultimately producing a safer product. Since safer products are socially-preferred, this effect of a mandatory disclosure rule is an additional benefit. Thus, a mandatory disclosure rule that appears "wasteful" ex post may be optimal ex ante when the incentives for safety-enhancing R&D are included.
When c H < c L , then any disclosure is welfare-impairing (relative to price-signaling). While it may be socially optimal to ban disclosure, this does not seem either feasible or sensible. However, if one were to ban disclosure, then both firms would earn their signaling profits, and it is straightforward to show (see the Appendix) that Π 
The Effect of Naive Consumers
This section will incorporate a small fraction, denoted ε, of consumers who are "naive" in 21 the sense that they do not apply the skeptical beliefs that are integral to both signaling and disclosure models. In what follows, we will indicate with a "^" those expressions that change due to the inclusion of naive consumers. Wherever the expression in question remains unchanged, we will omit the "^" to emphasize that it is unchanged. We first examine the case of naively optimistic consumers and then we consider the alternative case of naively pessimistic consumers. Finally, we provide a summary of the results for both types of naivete, emphasizing those results that are robust and those that differ.
Naively Optimistic Consumers
We assume that naively optimistic consumers become informed when the firm elects to disclose its safety, and thus the full-information prices and profits remain as before:
However, these consumers do not update their beliefs about safety based on the price charged following nondisclosure. Instead, they naively believe that the product is of high safety and purchase according to the demand curve q NO (p) / [α -(1 -θ H )δ -p]/β, where NO stands for "naively optimistic." The remaining fraction of consumers continue to exercise skeptical beliefs and purchase according to
The firm, accounting for these different consumer populations, faces the demand curve q (p)
This demand curve is similar to the original one except that the expression α -(1 -B(p))δ is replaced by α -ε(1 -θ H )δ -(1 -ε)(1 -B(p))δ. These two expressions are the same when skeptical consumers infer that the product is of high safety; that is,
However, when skeptical consumers infer that the product is of low safety, naively optimistic consumers continue to believe 22 it is of high safety. Then there is a modified version of α L , denoted α L , where
We continue to maintain Assumptions 1 and 2 (substituting α L for α L ), which means that all of the previous analysis continues to apply with the appropriate substitution of α L for α L . Thus, the separating equilibrium prices and profit for the low-safety type now become :
. Notice that the low-safety type no longer obtains its true full-information profits (as it would do under disclosure); rather, it obtains the profits it would obtain if skeptical consumers knew it was of low safety, while naively optimistic consumers continue to believe that it is of high safety. The separating equilibrium price for the high-safety type are likewise obtained by substituting α L for α L . This yields the following modified version of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Assuming a small fraction of naively optimistic consumers, there is a unique (refined) separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium in prices: 
the supporting beliefs are B(p) = θ L when p > P is of higher safety than it really is. What may be less expected is that a firm producing a high-safety product also benefits from the existence of such naively optimistic consumers; that is, Π The intuition for this result is as follows. Naively optimistic consumers buy from a lowsafety type as if it were a high-safety type, which increases the low-safety type's profits in a separating equilibrium. Consequently, there is a reduced temptation for the low-safety type to mimic the high-safety type's price (its sales volume would still go up if it were inferred to be of high safety, but now only among skeptical consumers). Since the high-safety type's price is set so as to just deter mimicry by the low-safety type, the high-safety type can lower its price toward its fullinformation optimum, which improves its profits. In addition to this externality between the two types of firm, there is an externality between the two consumer populations. In particular, the naively optimistic consumers raise the price in state L (since they purchase as if the product were of high safety, driving up the price) and lower the price in state H (since the high-safety type need not distort its price upward as much to signal high safety).
Next we consider the impact of a small fraction of naively optimistic consumers on the separating equilibrium when c L > c H . The impact of naively optimistic consumers on the low-safety 24 29 Distortion occurs when the high-safety type's cost disadvantage is moderate; when it is large, then naively optimistic consumers have no effect on the high-safety type's price or profits in a separating equilibrium. type is the same: both prices and profits are higher. Moreover, the high-safety firm continues to benefit from the presence of naively optimistic consumers, though the effect on its price is reversed.
Both consumer populations are using the correct safety assessment, and hence both purchase according to the demand function q(p) / [α -(1 -θ H )δ -p]/β, but the safer firm type distorts its price downward from its full-information price to signal safety when c L > c H . there is less downward distortion, and hence the high-safety type's price provides higher profits (since it is closer to the full-information optimum) when there are some naively optimistic consumers. The intuition for why the high-safety type benefits is also precisely the same as when c H > c L . The low-safety type's higher equilibrium profits imply a reduced temptation for the lowsafety type to mimic the high-safety type. Since the high-safety type's price is set so as to just deter mimicry by the low-safety type, the high-safety type can raise its price toward its full-information optimum, which improves its profits. Naively optimistic consumers now cause higher prices in both states of the world.
Finally, the effect of naively optimistic consumers on incentives for disclosure are adverse regardless of the ordering of costs. A firm producing a low-safety product would not disclose even if the cost of disclosure were zero (it prefers to milk the naive consumers), since
high-safety type's incentive to disclose is also reduced; since
Thus, one might ask whether a firm's response to consumer naivete might be to engage in more disclosure. We find that if "naivete" is interpreted as a persistent belief in high quality, then the 25 answer is "No." Neither type of firm benefits from disabusing consumers of this form of naivete.
Naively Pessimistic Consumers
Now consider what happens if instead of naively optimistic consumers, we incorporate naively pessimistic consumers. As before, these consumers do not update their beliefs about safety based on the price charged following non-disclosure. Instead, they naively believe that the product is of low safety and purchase according to the demand curve q 
This demand curve is similar to the original one except that the expression α -
These two expressions are the same when skeptical consumers infer that the product is of low safety; that is,
However, when skeptical consumers infer that the product is of high safety, naively pessimistic consumers continue to believe it is of low safety. Then there is a modified
We continue to maintain Assumptions 1 and 2 (substituting α H for α H ), which means that all of the previous analysis continues to apply with the appropriate substitution of α H for α H . As should now be obvious, a modified version of Proposition 3 can be obtained for the naively pessimistic case by making two switches in Proposition 3: 1) replace α L with α L ; 2) replace α H with α H . The lowsafety type's price, output and profits are unaffected by the presence of naively pessimistic consumer.
Without belaboring the point, one can now show that the following proposition holds.
pessimistic consumers. This is because optimism inflates the willingness-to-pay for the low-safety product, reducing mimicry incentives and relaxing the incentive constraints, thereby raising the high-safety type's profits under signaling, while pessimism deflates the willingness-to-pay for the high-safety product, reducing its profitability under signaling.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered two channels through which consumers might learn about product safety and how liability influences the use of these channels. First, a firm with private information about the safety of its good might make a credible (but costly) voluntary disclosure.
If the firm does not make a voluntary disclosure, then consumers will attempt to infer safety from the product's price. We find that when the firm does not face substantial liability for a consumer's harm (which corresponds to marginal cost increasing in safety), then higher safety is signaled by a price which is distorted upward from its full-information value. Since disclosure allows the safer type to lower its price and sell more output, it is the safer type that will elect to disclose its safety voluntarily if the disclosure cost is not prohibitive. However, it will do so less often than would be socially optimal, since it considers only the gain in profits and not the accompanying gain in consumer surplus that arises from the lower price and higher output. On the other hand, when the firm does face substantial liability for a consumer's harm (which corresponds to marginal cost decreasing in safety), then higher safety is signaled by a price which is distorted downward from its full-information value. In this case, disclosure would allow the safer type to raise its price and sell less output, which improves its profits but reduces consumer (and total) surplus. Again, it is the safer type that will elect to disclose its safety if the disclosure cost is not prohibitive, but now all 28 disclosure is welfare-impairing.
Mandatory disclosure could be beneficial in some circumstances, though they are quite limited. In part this is because this model recognizes that information will be transmitted through the price if not through direct disclosure. Moreover, the way the information is transmitted through signaling may be socially beneficial, as occurs when the firm distorts its price downward from its full-information monopoly price. This latter result requires that the firm face substantial liability for a consumer's loss (specifically, γ > k). Of course, γ > k may not hold (even if, de jure, there is substantial liability placed on the firm) if there are imperfections in enforcement that shift effective liability back to the consumer. Examples readily come to mind: 1) failure to file; 2) problems of proving causation; 3) difficulties in proving duty or fault; and 4) caps on damage awards. Such difficulties can shift the result to being somewhat more supportive of the circumstances that make mandatory disclosure socially desirable.
We considered the possibility that some fraction of consumers may be naively optimistic (rather than skeptical), and always purchase as if the product were of high safety. This turns out to improve the profits of both low-safety and high-safety types. A low-safety type is better off because naively optimistic consumers demand more at the same price than do skeptical consumers (who recognize that the firm's product is of low safety). A high-safety type is better off because the improvement in low-safety profits reduces the low-safety type's incentive to mimic the price of the high-safety type, which allows the high-safety type to distort its price less (either upward or downward, as dictated by the cost configuration) from its full-information price. Thus, the firm's response to naively-optimistic consumers is to engage in less disclosure; the low-safety type still has no incentive to disclosure while the high-safety type's incentive to disclose is reduced.
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We then contrasted this with the possibility that some fraction of consumers may be naively pessimistic (rather than skeptical), and always purchase as if the product were of low safety. This turns out to leave low-safety profits unaffected but reduce the profits of the high-safety type.
Pessimistic consumers have two effects on the high-safety type's profits. The direct effect is to reduce the consumer's willingness-to-pay for the high-safety product, which tends to reduce profits.
The indirect effect is to allow the firm to move its signaling price closer to its full-information price, which tends to increase profits. The direct effect dominates the indirect effect, so that pessimistic consumers ultimately result in lower signaling profits for the high-safety type. Consequently, its incentives to disclose are enhanced, since the gap between the full-information and signaling profits has increased.
Characterization of pooling equilibria and elimination via refinement
In this section we first characterize a pooling equilibrium, in which both firms charge the same price, denoted P P . We then argue that no such equilibrium survives refinement using the Intuitive Criterion.
If both firms charge the same price P P , then consumers believe that the firm is of type H with probability λ, in which case they demand (α H -P P )/β units, and of type L with probability1 -λ, in which case they demand (α L -P P )/β units. Let α G / λα H + (1 -λ)α L . Then both firms expect to sell (α G -P P )/β units if they charge the price P P . Both firms will pool at a price P P if the following incentive compatibility constraints hold: i) (P P -c H )(α G -P P )/β > max p (p -c H )(α L -p)/β and ii) (P P -c L )(α G -P P )/β > max p (p -c L )(α L -p)/β.
These inequalities indicate that both types would prefer to charge the pooling price and sell the average quantity demanded at that price, rather than deviating to any other price and being taken as an L-type firm. That is, the pooling price is supported by beliefs that assign the worst type (type L) to any price other than the pooling price. Any price P P satisfying these two inequalities provides a pooling equilibrium.
We need not actually construct a pooling equilibrium, as we need only show that if one exists, then there is a price to which the H-type firm could profitably defect and that would be unprofitable for an L-type firm, even if the consumer were to update her beliefs and infer that the signal came from an H-type firm. Thus, P P fails the Intuitive Criterion if there exists P* such that:
(iii) (P* -c H )(α H -P*)/β > (P P -c H )(α G -P P )/β and iv) (P* -c L )(α H -P*)/β < (P P -c L )(α G -P P )/β.
In the inequalities (iii)-(iv), the left-hand-side of each inequality is the profit that would be obtained by (respectively) the H-type and L-type firms by defecting (and being taken to be an H-type firm after the consumer has updated her beliefs), while the profits from the pooling equilibrium appear on the right-hand-side.
Let us denote the roots to the equality version of inequality (iii) as PG H and P 
